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Abstract: 
 
Purpose: The objective of this paper is to present the dividend signaling hypothesis, in 
particular, an empirical analysis of the relationship between the current changes in the level 
of a dividend paid (t0) and the future profitability of the companies.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: The dividend signaling hypothesis is empirically tested 
using the dynamic causality analysis based on the regression approach monitoring for 
expected earnings changes and past returns with a set of linear and non-linear controls. The 
conducted analyses comprised the domestic companies quoted on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange, which paid dividends in 2001-2016. 
Findings: The empirical results confirm that in the audited period, dividend decisions bring 
some information about the current situation (t = 0) and future (t = 1, t = 2) of the analyzed 
companies. It is also worth noting that among the analyzed indicators, the gross profit ratio 
(PBT) referred either to the market value or the book value of equity was most often in the 
statistically significant analyzes. In general, our results confirm the validity of the signaling 
hypothesis in the case of continuation-growth and initiation of payments in the Polish capital 
market as in the developed market. 
Practical Implications: We can say that investors, based on "signals" coming out of 
dividends advertisements, may conclude the future-income potential of a given company.   
Originality/value: As mentioned, the gross profit ratio (PBT) referred either to the market 
value or the book value of equity was most often in the statistically significant analyses. 
Thus, it seems that, contrary to the adopted assumptions in the literature, gross profit (PBT) 
in dividend signaling is more important than net profit (E).   
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When Miller and Modigliani (1961) first introduced the theory of the irrelevance of 
the dividend, the company's governing bodies, i.e., both the insiders and investors 
are known as outsiders, were assumed to have identical information about the 
company. In terms of a real financial market, this assumption, however, cannot be 
supported. Managers who deal with companies' affairs daily have information about 
the company's current standing and prospects that may never be available to the 
general public. This knowledge gap between insiders and outsiders may be 
considered to be a special form of information asymmetry. It may result in the 
business's intrinsic value being hidden and unknown to the market participants. If 
this is the case, the stock market price cannot be regarded as an accurate business 
value index. In an imperfect market, to fill the cognizance gap so that an investor can 
deduce a company's true value, managers can therefore face the necessity to share 
their knowledge with investors using a dividend tool. Stock prices are then believed 
to react to changes in dividends since the latter contains the necessary update and 
pieces of information to understand intrinsic business value (Thalassinos and 
Thalassinos, 2006; Thalassinos and Politis, 2011). Accordingly, dividend 
announcements may be perceived in the same way as a transmission of confidential 
information about the future possible income to be earned by the company (Miller 
and Modigliani, 1961; Curtis et al., 2020). This phenomenon is also known as the 
informational content of dividends, and in the modern financial, economic literature, 
it is also referred to as the theory of signaling (Filbeck, 2009, Brigham and Houston, 
2012, Araujo et al., 2011). 
 
According to the signaling theory, investors based on signals containing information 
derived from dividend announcements may deduce future business yield. For this 
theory to prove efficient, i.e., for the market to respond positively to announcements 
about the growth of dividends and react negatively in the reverse situation, two 
conditions must be met. First of all, managers need to have private information on 
the prospects of a given company inaccessible from the outside. They must also be 
willing to share the news with the market participants. Secondly, the signal sent by 
managers must not be noisy, i.e., dividend growth announcements should be 
combined with specific business plans and adequate funding sources, so that those 
who lack the information on the company's prospects are unable to imitate such 
signals and send false information to the market (Koch and Shenoy, 1999). 
 
If managers have comparatively more information on the companies' business 
prospects than external investors, they may be able to use the announcement of 
dividend change as a tool to generate news to the financial market about the 
company's future growth and profits. On the other hand, external investors may 
perceive these pieces of information as a reflection of the manager's assessment of 
the company's business performance and prospects. The announcement of the 
increase in the payment of dividends may be interpreted positively, i.e., that the 
company is well ahead of the growth prospects and profits. Therefore the current 
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price of its shares should respond positively. Similarly, an announcement about a 
dividend reduction may be treated as bad news - a signal that the company has poor 
prospects; the current stock price may react negatively in this case. In connection 
with the above, it is not a surprise that the managers do not want to announce any 
reduction in the dividend, and corporations are unwilling to change the adopted 
withdrawal policy (Lintner, 1956). Managers increase dividends only if they believe 
that the company's profits will increase permanently and reduce dividends only if the 
current level of payments cannot be maintained in the future. This prediction of 
behavior is in line with the so-called dividend smoothing hypothesis, where 
managers strive to smooth out the level of the dividend in the long run and thus will 
not keep up to significant dividend increases unless they can maintain the increased 
dividends also in the foreseeable future (Chen et al., 2012, Lipson et al., 1998).  
 
Lipson et al. (1998) have further stated that managers will not even initiate dividend 
payments until they conclude that future profits may sustain the dividends. It should 
be noted that, although the management board of the company may benefit from a 
change in the dividend in some cases, these changes may, however, generate 
ambiguous signals like in a situation where the company reduces dividend payments 
and uses its own funds to finance investments to improve future performance 
indicators. Without sufficient information, market participants may mistakenly 
interpret the event as a signal of deteriorating prospects, and the stock prices in the 
short run may consequently decrease (Soter et al., 1996, Vernimmen et al., 2014). 
 
Existing efforts to examine the above issues have been conducted mostly in 
developed markets using the event analysis or cointegration and causality tests 
(Garrett and Priestley, 2000; Mougoué and Rao, 2003). On the contrary, the research 
conducted in emerging markets has been partially affected by limitations in the data 
availability and estimation techniques (Fairchild et al., 2014, Lee et al., 2012; 
Kadioglu and Ocal, 2016). Nevertheless, more research still needs to address 
specific issues related to emerging markets and their formal and legal ineffectiveness 
(Wrońska, 2009; Brycz and Pauka, 2013; Rupeika-Apoga et al., 2018). This paper 
aims to explore the informational content of dividend changes taking into account 
the Polish stock market. 
 
This paper addresses gaps in the existing literature by making three distinct 
contributions to the body of knowledge in corporate finance. The signaling 
hypothesis is empirically tested using the dynamic causality analysis based on the 
regression approach monitoring for expected earnings and past returns with a set of 
linear and non-linear controls (Fama and French, 2001, Michaely et al., 2018, 
Grullon et al., 2005, Ball and Brown, 1968). For this study, a specific set of data 
from companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange is used. The panel regression 
with the autoregressive structure and dummy variables is applied to measure the 
informational content of dividends. The results obtained for the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange confirm the existence of dependencies verified during the previous 
analyzes for other developed and emerging markets. In this paper, the gap between 
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the existing economic theory and empirical observations is summarized into testable 
hypotheses considering links between changes in dividends and future companies' 
prospects represented by the market value of equity and the book value of equity. 
Secondly, the government, as the major shareholder, is in this paper isolated from 
the informational effect that dividends exhibit legal inefficiencies and political risk. 
The conviction has guided such an elimination that the dividend decisions could 
often result from political rather than economic reasons in the case of the State-
owned companies. As a result of the selection carried out in this way, a test sample 
of 250 enterprises corresponding to 1292 dividend events was obtained. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides for a review of the 
literature on the informational content of dividends in developed markets. The 
subsequent section 3 describes the Polish capital market and the Polish stock 
exchange in the spirit of recent empirical results of the signaling hypothesis tested in 
emerging markets. In section 4, the model specification is presented. Data 
description, the paper's main results, and robustness checks linking the theoretical 
model with the empirical analysis are presented in sections 5 and 6. The final section 
7 summarizes the results and draws implications for market efficiency. 
 
2. Literature Review - Dividend Signaling Hypothesis in Developed 
Markets  
 
Koch and Shenoy (1999), Allen and Michaely (2003), Al-Malkawi et al. (2010), 
Chen (2006), Seaton (2006), Zenonos (2003) agree that the signaling theory carries 
two important empirically verifiable implications which have been drawn much 
attention in terms of the related literature. The relevant literature states that stock 
prices should move in the same direction as unexpected changes in dividends 
immediately after the announcement of the relevant information. According to the 
other pieces of literature, which also constitutes a central concern of this paper, 
changes in the dividends should involve movement in the same direction as changes 
in the future profits. This implication may be reduced in practice to the question of 
whether the future business performance may be predicted with sufficient accuracy 
based on changes in the current dividend policy. 
 
Watts (1973) was one of the first scientists who tried to verify the claim that based 
on information about past and current trends in dividends, future profits could be 
predicted better than on the basis of information on the past and current profits. 
Using a sample of 310 corporations for 1946-1967, Watts (1973) tested whether the 
yield in the year t + 1 may be explained by the current value of dividends or profits t. 
The results of such analyzes confirmed by Gonedes et al. (1978) showed that there 
was a relationship between future profits and current unexpected changes in 
dividends, which would have confirmed the hypothesis of signaling, but the value of 
information contained in dividends due to small statistical significance of results was 
very small. The lack of dependence between the current changes in the dividend 
policy and future profits was also indicated by Benartzi et al. (1997) and DeAngelo 
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et al. (1996). In response to the aforementioned findings Laub (1976) and Pettit 
(1976) independently contested the dividends to contain information on future 
profits. The results of Healy and Palepu (1988) are also partially consistent with the 
signaling theory. In the sample of enterprises that had initiated dividend payments, 
they showed that the profit of those enterprises increased in the year of initiation and 
in two consecutive years. In the sample of enterprise, that had ceased to pay 
dividends, the obtained results were the opposite of what the signaling theory had 
predicted. The profits of these enterprises decreased in the year in which the 
information about discontinuation of payments took place, but in the next two years 
it already significantly increased. 
 
The signaling hypothesis was revived in numerous studies conducted in the US 
market and described in recent papers of Grullon et al. (2002; 2005), Nissim and Ziv 
(2001), Howatt et al. (2009) and Chen and Fu (2011). The empirical results are 
ambiguous ranging from partially confirming the informational content of dividends 
to those completely rejecting the signaling hypothesis. For example, Grullon et al. 
(2002) on a sample of enterprises that had changed their dividends by more than 
10%, showed that the increase or respective reduction of dividends in subsequent 
years was associated with a decline and adequate increase in profitability measured 
by ROA and a decrease (increase) in systematic risk. Grullon et al. (2005) also 
showed that the changes in the dividend were negatively correlated with future 
changes in profitability i.e., ROA. These statements have allowed Grullon et al. 
(2005) to conclude that changes in the dividend policy do not contain any 
information about future profits. This hypothesis has neither been confirmed by Ap 
Gwilym et al. (2005) in the case of dividend events for UK companies. The authors 
have found, however, a statistically significant proof of the positive impact of the 
decision to resume dividend payments on the future profitability of the companies 
measured by ROE, but only in the first year after the decision was made. In the case 
of the next two years, profitability decreased. Those results are in line with the 
analyses conducted for French and Swiss markets (Vieira and Raposo, 2007, 
Stacescu, 2006). 
 
Outcomes of the research conducted by Nissim and Ziv (2001) are consistent with 
the results obtained by Healy and Palepu (1988). Although the authors generally 
confirm that changes in dividends and changes in profits are positively correlated, 
which supports the signaling hypothesis, they have also found no link between the 
reduction of the dividend and the future profitability (ROE) of enterprises. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the results of Grullon et al. (2002), Howatt et al. (2009) 
have fully confirmed the dividend signaling hypothesis. The results of their research 
have shown that the increase / initiation of the payment (reduction / cessation of 
payment) of dividends in the future leads to an increase (decrease) in the enterprise 
value. Surprisingly the results of Howatt et al. (2009) have also shown that changes 
in the dividends lead immediately and in the future to an increase in risk. Result of 
Chen and Fu (2011) have been inconclusive. They confirm the correctness of the 
signaling hypothesis in relation to the increase in the dividend ratio and future results 
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measured by the volume of profit from business operations. In the case of the 
indicator of future profits expressed in terms of EBITDA (earnings before interest, 
tax, depreciation and amortization) their results have rejected the signaling 
hypothesis. 
 
Summarizing the above review of studies, one can assume that the evidence 
collected for the US market does not allow to state unequivocally that changes in the 
dividend policy carry information on the future performance of the companies. A 
similar conclusion may be also found by following the results of the research carried 
out on the stock markets in other countries. That is why in the next sections the 
research will focus on the Polish stock market. 
  
3. Informational Content of Dividends in the Polish Capital Market  
 
Among the works that have confirmed the signaling hypothesis in emerging markets, 
for example, Chowdhury et al. (2014) using data from the Chinese capital market 
and ROE as a measure of profits show that the increase in the dividend payments is a 
positive signal about future profits of companies, while the reduction in the dividend 
policy is generally considered as bad news. Similar conclusions were obtained by 
Lee (2010), who used EPS as a measure of profits and examined the sample 
consisted of those companies from the Singapore stock market that increased 
dividends. Choi et al. (2011) used ROE as a profit measure. A full sample of 
companies listed on the South Korean market positively confirmed the signaling 
hypothesis after reducing the sample to only those enterprises where dividend payout 
events occurred. As a result, the authors have formulated the conclusion that the 
corporate governance system may determine the informational content of dividends.  
 
These results are in line with the study conducted by Liljeblom et al. (2015) on a 
sample of companies from Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, which have confirmed 
the informational content of dividends for Swedish companies only EPS has been 
used for measuring profits. Other studies exploiting the relationship between the 
current changes in the dividend and the future profits of companies in the Iranian 
and Malaysian markets have only partially confirmed the signaling hypothesis. In 
particular, the results of the research by Lee et al. (2012) for the stock market in 
Malaysia and EPS as a profit measure have indicated that changes in dividends 
regardless of the increase or decrease of the payout ratio must be significant (50% or 
more) to give a specific signal about future profits. The range of this signal is limited 
to the first year after the changes in dividends are introduced. 
 
The analyzes conducted by Ghodrati and Hashemi (2014) for companies from Iran 
show in turn that the impact of the increase in dividends on the future profitability of 
companies measured by ROE is positive in the next three years (+1, +2, +3) but 
statistically significant only in the first year. However, in the case of dividend 
reductions, the authors do not confirm the existence of specific links between ROE 
and dividend changes. Just as numerous studies more or less confirm the existence 
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of links in line with the signaling hypothesis in the markets, the same hypothesis has 
been rejected using samples of companies listed in stock markets in Turkey 
(Kadioglu and Ocal, 2016), Thailand (Fairchild et al., 2014), Portugal (Vieira and 
Raposo, 2007). 
 
In the Polish stock market Wrońska (2009), Brycz and Pauka (2013), Pieloch-
Babiarz (2015) have tried to verify the presented aspect of the signaling hypothesis. 
Wrońska (2009) has analyzed the relationship between dividends and various 
measures of operating effects (net profit, operating profit, net cash flows, net 
operating cash flow), which companies reported both before and after dividend 
payment. The results of that research do not confirm the signaling hypothesis 
because the conclusion is that in the case of the audited enterprises, dividends 
contain information on past results and may be used as a signal only for those 
results. In turn, Brycz and Pauka (2013), in the case of initiating dividend payments, 
have tried to answer the question of whether the information on the beginning of 
dividend payments may be treated as an actual signal from the management board of 
those companies about their expected better financial standing in the future. The 
results of their analyzes show that the companies initiating dividend payments in the 
future increase their assets and revenues from sales; however, as the authors have 
stated, that the informational content of initial dividends regarding future results is 
not strong enough so that investors can only base their expectations on it. The 
initiation of dividend payments has also been the object of the research conducted by 
Pieloch-Babiarz (2015), who, unlike the above-mentioned authors, has confirmed 
the signaling hypothesis with its analysis results. In particular, she has stated that the 
companies that have initiated the payment of dividends are usually profitable a few 
years before (t-5) making the first payment as well as a few years after (t + 4), in the 
first year (t + 1) after the year of initiation, the average profitability of the companies 
decreases. 
 
Literature studies concluded that scientists generally agree that dividend payments 
carry certain information, but there is no agreement about what they really signal 
(Frankfurter et al., 2003; Benhamouda, 2007). Whether the dividends signal the 
trend of historical profits or whether they are a more precise a measure of current 
profits or maybe they signal expectations about future profits, remains an open 
question and is the main concern of this paper. It bears noting that the Polish capital 
market, with its stock exchange in Warsaw, is the main focus of this paper, is 
claimed to be the leader among capital markets in central and eastern Europe.  
 
Although its origins date back to 1809 and the French Commercial Code, the 
outbreak of World War II formally froze Poland's capital market for over 40 years. 
The Warsaw Stock Exchange was established on April 12, 1991, as a joint-stock 
company owned by the Minister of Privatization and commenced its operations four 
days later. In the first two years, the stock exchange sessions took place once, and 
then twice a week, and the turnover was carried out on shares privatized by the state 
treasury of companies. The years 1993-1994 were marked by strong increases, 
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followed by declines in the prices of listed instruments. In 1993, the value of the 
main stock index increased by 1095%, to drop by 50% by the end of the first quarter 
of 1994. These events were characteristic of the young market in the speculative 
phase of the stock exchange in Poland. In the following years, the Polish capital 
market was gradually evolving. New categories of financial instruments (bonds, 
futures) were introduced to the market, and stock exchange sessions were held five 
times a week. During this period, privatizations of large companies took place, 
which significantly contributed to the increase in the capital market's attractiveness 
from the point of view of the number of listed entities, their market value, and 
liquidity.  
 
At the end of 2000, listed companies' market value amounted to PLN 130 billion, 
while the turnover of shares amounted to PLN 84 billion in the whole year, which 
was 1657% and 623% more than in 1994, respectively. A new quotation system was 
introduced, thanks to which transaction terms changed radically, and investors were 
able to react quickly to various types of information appearing during the day. The 
accession of Poland to the European Union in 2004 resulted in the adoption of 
uniform regulations in many areas of life, including the transactions in the capital 
markets in the community's countries. These changes were the opening of the capital 
market in Poland to issuers and foreign investors. In the years 2004-2017, the 
number of foreign companies listed in Warsaw increased from 5 to 50, and their 
market value at the end of 2017 amounted to PLN 709 billion. On the other hand, 
investors' activity on the Warsaw Stock Exchange measured by the average daily 
turnover in the same period increased from PLN 234 million to PLN 1 billion. The 
data from the Warsaw Stock Exchange shows that the percentage share of foreign 
investors in stock trading in 2004 was 33%, while in 2017, it was 53%. At the end of 
2017, there were more than 3,000 companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, 
not to mention financial instruments, including 894 listed companies, 174 series of 
futures, 218 options, 943 structured products, 953 issues of bonds, and 39 
investment certificates and ETFs. 
 
4. Methodological Framework and Testable Hypotheses 
 
Although the informational content of dividends was recorded on the capital market 
as early as in the 1950s and early 1960s, in the initial period, it did not have a 
theoretical foundation because it was not modeled until the end of the 1970s and 
early 1980s. Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), Miller and Rock 
(1985), modeling approaches most often elaborated upon in the literature are based 
on several diverse assumptions, but they also have and are common. First of all, it is 
common to assume an asymmetry of information in the market between its managers 
and shareholders. Managers represent a group with the best, most comprehensive 
information on the company's current standing and prospects. Secondly, all authors 
assume that announcements about dividends are used as a signaling mechanism 
because they contain certain information about the company, and manager-divers 
have the motivation to transfer their private information to the market to close the 
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information gap. A common element of the models is the general conclusion that the 
announcement of the increase in the dividend is interpreted as a good signal that 
communicates to the market that the company has good prospects for the future and 
may increase cash expenditures. 
 
           (1) 
 
where financial indicator (book value or market value of equity respectively) Y2 = 
f(I1) + ν, D1 ≤ ω0. In this setup larger dividends should be associated with lower 
financial indicator changes and since dividends are paid before the financial 
indicator is known to the general public, under certainty equivalence condition 
paying higher dividends will increase the probability of foregoing future investment 
opportunities, as the (expected) volatility of company value grows higher. Then 
dividend changes should be followed by changes in the business value volatility in 
the opposite direction. Furthermore, under asymmetric information following a 
dividend increase, there is a larger  increase  in the business value volatility for 
enterprises with smaller current earnings, since smaller earnings give larger 
investment opportunities for a given dividend payment. Therefore, the same 
dividend should carry a larger informational content for future changes in the 
business value indicator for firms with smaller earnings. Finally announcements of 
dividend changes should carry a larger information content (i.e., have a larger 
announcement return), as the expected reduction in the business value increases. 
 
In this section, the methodology to empirically test whether dividend changes have 
the informational content about future earnings via three distinct approaches. First, 
the relation between dividend changes and future earnings changes is estimated in a 
regression approach, which includes variables suggested by the extant literature to 
control expected earnings changes in the absence of any dividend change. The 
signaling tool used in all analyzes is the change in the level of the paid dividend 
(Benartzi et al., 1997; Nissim and Ziv, 2001; Grullon et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2012) 
and is calculated as the rate of change between the level of dividend paid per one 
share in the current year - the base year DIV0 and the level of dividend paid in the 
previous year DIV−1. The formulas are presented in the following equation: 
 
 
       (2) 
 
where ∆DIV0 is the change in the paid dividend between the current and previous 
year, DIV0 is a dividend per share in the current - base year, DIV−1 is a dividend per 
share in the previous year compared to the base year. Then research scheme related 
to the informational content of dividends may be summarized into three testable 
hypotheses using financial indicators Fi described below. 
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Benartzi et al. (1997) were the first to use the indicator expressing the relation of the 
difference between net profit in a year and the level of net profit in a year in the 
dividend signaling model as a dependent variable, i.e., the financial result expected 
in subsequent years. t − 1 to the market value of equity in year -1, where year 0 is the 
current (base) year in which the examined change in the level of dividend paid takes 
place. In later years, this indicator was also used in their research by Nissim and Ziv 
(2001), Kadioglu and Ocal (2016), and Al-Shattarat et al. (2018). Following the 
authors mentioned in this article, a general hypothesis (H1) was formulated, which 
states that: 
 
H1: Dividend changes signal the future company’s financial standing i.e. yield 
changes related to the market value of equity in the previous period P−1 described by 




Nissim and Ziv (2001) formulated the opinion that changes in corporations' future 
results should be determined rather by the book value of the equity capital engaged 
in their activities, not by the market value of these capitals. Therefore, the authors, 
by modifying the Benartzi et al. (1997) model in their research as a measure of 
future financial results, used the ratio of the difference between net profit in the year 
and the level of net profit in the year t − 1  about the book value of equity in the year 
t − 1. In later years, this indicator, as a dependent variable in the analyzed model, 
was also used by Grullon et al. (2005), Choi et al. (2011), Kadioglu and Ocal 
(2016), Liu and Chen (2015), Vieira and Raposo (2007). Based on the examples 
cited in this article, a general hypothesis (H2) was formulated, according to which: 
 
H2: Dividend changes signal the future company’s financial standing i.e. yield 





As suggested by Grullon et al. (2002; 2005), the dividend signaling theory does not 
precisely indicate which measures of financial performance predict dividend 
payments, i.e., whether future profits or future profitability (Dividend-signaling 
theory does not indicate precisely which companies performance metric (e.g., future 
income or future profitability) should be used.) Bearing this fact in mind, the authors 
have introduced in their models as a dependent variable, i.e., a variable reflecting 
future financial results, the difference in the level of return on assets in the year t and 
t − 1 and the return on equity in the year t and used both changes (e.g., Change in 
Return on Assets) and the level of change (e.g., Level of Return on Assets) of their 
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value. A similar research approach may also be found in Choi et al. (2011), Liu and 
Chen (2015). This article includes the suggested solution in the form of the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Dividend changes signal changes in the future company’s financial standing, 
i.e., yield changes where dependent variables are either relative or absolute. 
 
Especially to test for the informational content of dividend changes, the earning 
changes on the percentage of dividend change ∆DIV and a series of explanatory 
variables are regressed. All earning changes are computed as the difference between 
earnings announced after the dividend change and earnings for the same period in 
the prior year (before the dividend change) and scaled by the market value of equity 
the quarter before the dividend announcement, similar to (Benartzi et al., 1997). The 
earning changes are calculated over one year prior, current year, as well as one year 
ahead changes after the dividend announcement: 
 
      (3) 
 
Empirically, negative dividend changes have a larger effect on yields related to the 
book value of equity/changes in yields related to the market value of equity/changes 
of the future company’s financial standing than positive dividend changes. If 
variation in informational content causes the association between dividend changes 
and respective indicator, dividend decreases would be expected to have more 
informational content about future earnings than dividend increases, i.e.: 
 





Divides set of dividends into distinct subgroups. Each of the above equations is a 
form of a panel regression with an autoregressive structure imposed by independent 
variables and estimated using the maximum likelihood method. 
 
5. Empirical Results and Discussion  
 
The analysis of the relationship between the current changes in the paid dividend (t = 
0) and the current (t = 0) and future profitability of companies (t + 1; t + 2), which 
made these changes, covered the years 2001-2016. The initial test sample consisted 
of all Polish companies, which were not banks and insurers, which at the end of 
2016 were listed on the main market of the Warsaw Stock Exchange and paid 
dividends. The list of companies paying the dividend and their DPS index have been 
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identified based on calendars of dividend payments included in the Annual Reports 
in respective years.  
 
However, due to the analysis methodology and the signaling period adopted (t + 2), 
which meant the need to obtain financial data for 1 year before and 1-2 years after 
the payment of dividends, the initial sample was narrowed down. Only companies 
that had paid dividends were included in the study - not earlier than in 2001 and not 
later than in 2015. At the end of the sample, the companies in which the State 
Treasury was the dominant shareholder were eliminated from the sample. The 
conviction guided the elimination that the dividend decisions could often result from 
political rather than economic reasons in those companies. As a result of the 
selection carried out in this way, a test sample of 250 entities corresponding to 1292 
dividend events was obtained. A detailed breakdown of the sample size by year, and 
individual dividend events is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The size of the sample of companies surveyed by year and individual 
dividend events 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
DPS growth    6        2      7     15    22    19    20    27    16     29    25     44    50    47    72 
DPS init.    7        8    16     11    16    18      8    23    25     22    38     46    31    38    38 
DPS unchd.    4        3      2       6      4    10    10      2    10     14    16     11      8    22    22 
DPS red.    4        6      2       1      5      8    13    13    21       7    16     12    26    27    21 
DPS stop  12      10      8       6      4    11    11      9    18     23    15     28    29    19    17 
Total   21      19    27     33    47    55    51    65     72    72    95   113  115  134  153 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Own compilation based on EMIS data from particular years. 
 
As already mentioned, Grullon et al. (2002; 2005) suggest that the dividend 
signaling theory does not precisely indicate which financial indices predict dividend 
payments. A review of the literature confirms this opinion because of the financial 
indices (Benartzi et al., 1997; Nissim and Ziv, 2001; Kadioglu and Ocal, 2016), 
operating profit (the earnings before extraordinary items; e.g. (Chen and Fu, 2011; 
Grullon et al., 2005; Stacescu, 2006; Choi et al., 2011) or EBITDA (earnings before 
interests, taxes, depreciation, and amortization; (Chen and Fu, 2011; Chowdhury et 
al., 2014). This article tries to determine the financial indicators - profit that would 
be most closely related to dividend signaling, using the data coming from the profit 
and loss account (name: Incomes). For the sample selected using criteria defined 
above, the data from financial statements was gathered from WSE websites and 
EMIS database and used for calculating the following five financial indices, i.e.: 
1. net profit / loss (E), 
2. operating profit / loss (OP), 
3. gross profit / loss on sales (GPoS), 
4. profit / loss on sales (PoS), 
5. profit / loss before tax (PBT). 
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Turning to the verification of the accepted research hypotheses, i.e., examining the 
relationship between the dividend paid in a given year ∆DIV0 and the results 
obtained in the current year t = 0 and the next t + 1 and the next t + 2, about the 
dividend payment year, the first step was to try to answer the question whether 
dividend payment brings with it hidden information about the future-income 
potential of the company. Results gathered in table 2 present estimates from the 
panel regression for each indicator. One can interpret them in a way that the payment 
of dividend brings certain information.  
 
However, it seems that to the greatest extent, which is also consistent with the 
conclusions of Benartzi et al. (1997), it is information on the current financial 
standing of the paying entity. What is worth noting in the presented statement, 
regardless of the considered hypothesis, the financial results depicted by indicators 
based on the change in the level of net profit (E) are statistically significant in all 
three hypotheses. In hypotheses 1 and 2, significant indicators of results are 
indicators based on changes in the gross profit/loss of sales (GPoS) and profit/loss 
before tax (PBT). 
 
Since researchers Koch and Shenoy (1999), Allen and Michaely (2003), AlMalkawi 
et al. (2010), Chen (2006), Seaton (2006), Zenonos (2003) agree that the signaling 
theory carries important empirically verifiable implications. It also states that 
changes in the dividends should involve the same directional changes in future 
profits. Furthermore, Lintner (1956) claims that changes in the dividends go hand in 
hand with long-term changes in the level of earnings. Managers also show a great 
reluctance to reduce or increase the dividend if it may be necessary to change these 
decisions. Therefore, the increase in the paid dividends occurs only when the 
management board believes that it is possible to maintain this level in the future. 
Managers also have a strong aversion to reduce the dividend and make such 
decisions only when unfavorable conditions cannot be overcome quickly.
 
 
Table 2. Identification of informational content of dividends based on  significance for  as a dependent variable 
 
H1 H2 H3a 
Time period t=0 t+1 t+2 t=0 t+1 t+2 t=0 t+1 t+2 
indicator (E0-E-1)/P-1 (E1-E0)/P-1 (E2-E1)/P-1 (E0-E-1)/B-1 (E1-E0)/B-1 (E2-E1)/B-1 (E0/E-1)/-1 (E1/E0)-1 (E2/E1)-1 
Estimate 3.5050 -0.1530 -0.0136 3.2926 -0.0925 0.0207 0.0272 0.0068 -0.0044 
Std. error 1.0105 0.3450 0.1617 1.7636 0.2889 0.1168 0.0145 0.0280 0.0225 
t-student 3.4690 -0.4430 -0.0840 1.8670 -0.3200 0.1770 1.8710 0.2440 -0.1960 
p-value (0.0042) (0.6648) (0.9342) (0.0846) (0.7538) (0.8624) (0.0839) (0.8114) (0.8476) 
indicator (OP0-OP-1)/P-1 (OP1-OP0)/P-1 (OP2-OP1)/P-1 (OP0-OP-1)/B-1 (OP1-OP0)/B-1 (OP2-OP1)/B-1 (OP0/OP-1)-1 (OP1/OP0)-1 (OP2/OP1)-1 
Estimate 4.0533 -0.6785 -1.4552 2.5285 -0.5223 -0.6829 0.0708 -0.0052 0.0002 
Std. error 1.2352 1.1728 0.5933 2.0812 1.4402 0.7385 0.0904 0.0113 0.0090 
t-student 3.2810 -0.5790 -2.4530 1.2150 -0.3630 -0.9250 0.7830 -0.4660 0.0260 
p-value (0.0060) (0.5728) (0.0291) (0.2460) (0.7227) (0.3719) (0.4474) (0.6492) (0.9793) 
indicator (GPoS0-GPoS-1)/P-1 (GPoS1-GPoS0)/P-1 (GPoS2-GPoS1)/P-1 (GPoS0-GPoS-1)/B-1 (GPoS1-GPoS0)/B-1 (GPoS2-GPoS1)/B-1 (GPoS0/GPoS-1)-1 (GPoS1/GPoS0)-1 (GPoS2/GPoS1)/-1 
Estimate 2.8311 -1.0158 -0.9125 2.1661 -0.0379 -0.2520 -0.0385 0.0280 -0.0132 
Std. error 0.8404 1.4770 0.5663 1.1935 1.0458 0.4691 0.1001 0.0360 0.0302 
t-student 3.3690 -0.6880 -1.6110 1.8159 -0.0360 -0.5370 -0.3840 0.7780 -0.4360 
p-value (0.0050) (0.5037) (0.1311) (0.0927) (0.9717) (0.6001) (0.7069) (0.4504) (0.6703) 
indicator (PoS0-PoS-1)/P-1 (PoS1-PoS0)/P-1 (PoS2-PoS1)/P-1 (PoS0-PoS-1)/B-1 (PoS1-PoS0)/B-1 (PoS2-PoS1)/B-1 (PoS0/PoS-1)-1 (PoS1/PoS0)-1 (PoS2/PoS1)-1 
Estimate 5.0385 -1.5993 -1.4579 1.3515 -1.6469 -0.4643 -0.0389 -0.0449 0.0095 
Std. error 1.6572 1.5769 0.7324 2.2019 1.9448 0.8202 0.0384 0.0301 0.0353 
t-student 3.0400 -1.0140 -1.9910 0.6140 -0.8470 -0.5660 -1.0130 -1.4910 0.2690 
p-value (0.0095) (0.3290) (0.0680) (0.5499) (0.4124) (0.5810) (0.3297) (0.1599) (0.7928) 
indicator (PBT0-PBT-1)/P-1 (PBT1-PBT0)/P-1 (PBT+2-PBT1)/P-1 (PBT0-PBT-1)/B-1 (PBT1-PBT0)/B-1 (PBT2-PBT1)/B-1 (PBT0/PBT-1)-1 (PBT1/PBT0)-1 (PBT2/PBT1)-1 
Estimate 3.0630 -0.1484 -0.0047 3.4222 -0.0847 0.0189 0.0284 -0.0015 -0.0076 
Std. error 0.8376 0.2695 0.1420 1.4513 0.2194 0.0991 0.0334 0.0258 0.0177 
t-student 3.6570 -0.5500 -0.0330 2.3580 -0.3860 0.1910 0.8510 -0.0600 -0.4300 
p-value (0.0029) (0.5913) (0.9741) (0.0347) (0.7058) (0.8517) (0.4101) (0.9531) (0.6751) 
Source: Own compilation. Results are presented up to four significant digits. P-values of significance test in brackets below. Independent variables for each 
model are mentioned above. Statistically significant variables are shaded  
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Also, Lipson et al. (1998) also notice that managers will not decide to initiate 
dividend payments unless they conclude that future profits may sustain them. 
 
Table 3. Informational content of dividend changes in relation to market value of 
equity when signals are positive  
 
0<ΔDIV0<1 ΔDIV0=1 
  t=0 t+1 t+2 t=0 t+1 t+2 
indicator (E0-E-1)/B-1 (E1-E0)/B-1 (E2-E1)/B-1 (E0-E-1)/B-1 (E1-E0)/B-1 (E2-E1)/B-1 
Estimate -0.0727 1.0125 0.5398 
<0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 0.6098 0.6478 0.2295 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student -0.1190 1.5630 2.3520 0.9220 3.0800 -0.3910 
p-value (0.9070) (0.1420) (0.0351) (0.3740) (0.0089) (0.7020) 
indicator (OP0-OP-1)/B-1 (OP1-OP0)/B-1 (OP2-OP1)/B-1 (OP0-OP-1)/B-1 (OP1-OP0)/B-1 (OP2-OP1)/B-1 
Estimate 0.1676 0.5745 0.5001 
<0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 0.6198 0.4264 0.2184 
<0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 0.2700 1.3470 2.2900 0.5160 1.7800 -1.1100 
p-value (0.7910) (0.2010) (0.0394) (0.6140) (0.0984) (0.2860) 
indicator (GPoS0-GPoS-1)/B-1 (GPoS1-GPoS0)/B-1 (GPoS2-GPoS1)/B-1 (GPoS0-GPoS-1)/B-1 (GPoS1-GPoS0)/B-1 (GPoS2-GPoS1)/B-1 
Estimate 0.0895 0.3840 0.0472 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 0.2949 0.5366 0.1804 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 0.3040 0.7160 0.2610 0.2700 0.3550 0.2290 
p-value (0.7660) (0.4870) (0.7980) (0.7910) (0.7290) (0.8220) 
indicator (PoS0-PoS-1)/B-1 (PoS1-PoS0)/B-1 (PoS2-PoS1)/B-1 (PoS0-PoS-1)/B-1 (PoS1-PoS0)/B-1 (PoS2-PoS1)/B-1 
Estimate 0.3808 0.5954 0.0634 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 0.4684 0.5061 0.2722 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 0.8130 1.1760 0.2330 0.2210 0.0730 -0.5260 
p-value (0.4310) (0.2610) (0.8190) (0.8280) (0.9430) (0.6080) 
indicator (PBT0-PBT-1)/B-1 (PBT1-PBT0)/B-1 (PBT2-PBT1)/B-1 (PBT0-PBT-1)/B-1 (PBT1-PBT0)/B-1 (PBT2-PBT1)/B-1 
Estimate 0.0518 1.0855 0.4425 
<0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 0.4075 0.5817 0.2092 
<0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 0.1270 1.8660 2.1160 0.8840 2.3600 -0.3740 
p-value (0.9010) (0.0848) (0.0543) (0.3930) (0.0349) (0.7140) 




Taking up subsequent analyzes, in the next step, we have tried to verify in the first 
place whether the increase in the paid dividend is a positive signal about the future 
performance of the company; in particular, two events have been taken into 
consideration, i.e., continuation - increase in payouts, i.e., an increase in the 
dividend paid about the previous year in a situation wherein the year t−1 the 
company also paid dividend which means 0 < ∆DIV0 < 1 and initiation of payments, 
i.e., an increase in the level of dividend paid about the previous year in a situation 
wherein the year t − 1 the company did not pay dividends, which means ∆DIV0 = 1. 
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Table 4. Informational content of dividend changes in relation to book value of 
equity when signals are positive  
 
0<ΔDIV0<1 ΔDIV0=1 
  t=0 t+1 t+2 t=0 t+1 t+2 
indicator (E0-E-1)/B-1 (E1-E0)/B-1 (E2-E1)/B-1 (E0-E-1)/B-1 (E1-E0)/B-1 (E2-E1)/B-1 
Estimate -0.0727 1.0125 0.5398 
<0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 0.6098 0.6478 0.2295 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student -0.1190 1.5630 2.3520 0.9220 3.0800 -0.3910 
p-value (0.9070) (0.1420) (0.0351) (0.3740) (0.0089) (0.7020) 
indicator (OP0-OP-1)/B-1 (OP1-OP0)/B-1 (OP2-OP1)/B-1 (OP0-OP-1)/B-1 (OP1-OP0)/B-1 (OP2-OP1)/B-1 
Estimate 0.1676 0.5745 0.5001 
<0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 0.6198 0.4264 0.2184 
<0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 0.2700 1.3470 2.2900 0.5160 1.7800 -1.1100 
p-value (0.7910) (0.2010) (0.0394) (0.6140) (0.0984) (0.2860) 
indicator (GPoS0-GPoS-1)/B-1 (GPoS1-GPoS0)/B-1 (GPoS2-GPoS1)/B-1 (GPoS0-GPoS-1)/B-1 (GPoS1-GPoS0)/B-1 (GPoS2-GPoS1)/B-1 
Estimate 0.0895 0.3840 0.0472 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 0.2949 0.5366 0.1804 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 0.3040 0.7160 0.2610 0.2700 0.3550 0.2290 
p-value (0.7660) (0.4870) (0.7980) (0.7910) (0.7290) (0.8220) 
indicator (PoS0-PoS-1)/B-1 (PoS1-PoS0)/B-1 (PoS2-PoS1)/B-1 (PoS0-PoS-1)/B-1 (PoS1-PoS0)/B-1 (PoS2-PoS1)/B-1 
Estimate 0.3808 0.5954 0.0634 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 0.4684 0.5061 0.2722 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 0.8130 1.1760 0.2330 0.2210 0.0730 -0.5260 
p-value (0.4310) (0.2610) (0.8190) (0.8280) (0.9430) (0.6080) 
indicator (PBT0-PBT-1)/B-1 (PBT1-PBT0)/B-1 (PBT2-PBT1)/B-1 (PBT0-PBT-1)/B-1 (PBT1-PBT0)/B-1 (PBT2-PBT1)/B-1 
Estimate 0.0518 1.0855 0.4425 
<0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 0.4075 0.5817 0.2092 
<0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 0.1270 1.8660 2.1160 0.8840 2.3600 -0.3740 
p-value (0.9010) (0.0848) (0.0543) (0.3930) (0.0349) (0.7140) 
Source: Own compilation. Results are presented up to four significant digits. P-values of significance test in 
brackets below.  
 
To sum up, both the increase in the dividend paid and the initiation of payments is 
clearly treated as a positive signal. Besides, it should be noted that since companies 
deciding to initiate dividend payments generally do not intend to stop at just paying 
out in one year. Still, these payments will also continue shortly (Ap Gwilym et al., 
2005) and that this action is justified in future financial indicators (Healy and 
Palepu, 1988), it may be assumed that initiating payments is a more important signal 
for investors - stronger than the usual, most often expected, a dividend increase, i.e., 
the payment of another dividend, but at a higher level than in the previous year. The 
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Table 5. Informational content of dividend changes in relation to relative changes of 
value indicators when signals are positive 
 
0<ΔDIV0<1 ΔDIV0=1 
  t=0 t+1 t+2 t=0 t+1 t+2 
indicator (E0/E-1)/-1 (E1/E0)-1 (E2/E1)-1 (E0/E-1)/-1 (E1/E0)-1 (E2/E1)-1 
Estimate 0.0198 0.0170 0.0010 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 0.0765 0.0091 0.0031 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 0.2590 1.8670 0.3220 1.0100 -1.2600 0.1460 
p-value (0.7990) (0.0846) (0.7530) (0.3330) (0.2310) (0.8860) 
indicator (OP0/OP-1)-1 (OP1/OP0)-1 (OP2/OP1)-1 (OP0/OP-1)-1 (OP1/OP0)-1 (OP2/OP1)-1 
Estimate 0.0001 0.0084 0.0025 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 0.0283 0.0138 0.0076 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 0.0050 0.6090 0.3260 1.0300 -0.0950 -0.2990 
p-value (0.9960) (0.5530) (0.7500) (0.3230) (0.9260) (0.7700) 
indicator (GPoS0/GPoS-1)-1 (GPoS1/GPoS0)-1 (GPoS2/GPoS1)/-1 (GPoS0/GPoS-1)-1 (GPoS1/GPoS0)-1 (GPoS2/GPoS1)/-1 
Estimate 0.0859 <0.0000 0.0823 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 0.1795 0.0190 0.1996 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 0.4780 -0.0020 0.4120 0.3380 0.0090 0.3220 
p-value (0.6400) (0.9980) (0.6870) (0.7410) (0.9930) (0.7520) 
indicator (PoS0/PoS-1)-1 (PoS1/PoS0)-1 (PoS2/PoS1)-1 (PoS0/PoS-1)-1 (PoS1/PoS0)-1 (PoS2/PoS1)-1 
Estimate 0.0066 0.0051 0.0013 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 0.0006 0.0114 0.0130 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 11.4700 0.4510 0.1030 -0.1810 -26.4000 -0.3680 
p-value (<0.0000) (0.6590) (0.9190) (0.8590) (<0.0000) (0.7190) 
indicator (PBT0/PBT-1)-1 (PBT1/PBT0)-1 (PBT2/PBT1)-1 (PBT0/PBT-1)-1 (PBT1/PBT0)-1 (PBT2/PBT1)-1 
Estimate 0.1104 0.1266 0.0012 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 0.0813 0.0187 0.0060 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 1.3590 6.7870 0.2040 0.3650 0.6450 -0.3510 
p-value 
(0.1970) (0.0001) (0.8420) (0.7210) (0.5300) (0.7310) 
Source: Own compilation. Results are presented up to four significant digits. P-values of significance test in 
brackets below.  
 
In the case when 0 < ∆DIV0 < 1, as shown in Tables 3 and 4, three out of five 
considered indicators have been statistically significant. In particular, it may be 
concluded that the continuation-increase in dividend payments has carried 
information about positive change in year 2 of financial indicators based on changes 
in E and OP levels and PBT in t = 1 and t = 2. 
 
In the results presented in Table 5, a positive and statistically significant response 
may be found for three out of five considered indicators for the analyzed changes in 
the paid dividend. However, these are indicators based on the change in E and PBT 
levels in t = 1 and PoS in t = 0. When ∆DIV0 = 1, the following results are gathered 
in table 3 four out of five, and in table 4, three out of five considered indicators have 
been statistically significant. In particular, it may be concluded that the initiation of 
dividend payments carries positive information. The signaling theory for t = 1 about 
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H1 and H2 was confirmed for indicators based on the change in E, OP, and PBT and 
H1 for PoS. In the case of H1 in turn and the indicator based on OP change in t = 2, 
although the index is statistically significant, it is negative, not in line with 
expectations. In H3, only 1 of the 5 indicators considered has been statistically 
significant (index based on the change of PoS in t = 1); however, the assessment's 
value has been negative, which is inconsistent with the conclusions stemming from 
the signaling hypothesis. 
 
In our further study, we again follow Lintner (1956), who have claimed that 
managers reduce dividends only when the current level of payments cannot be 
sustained in the future. According to the signaling theory, the reduction in the level 
of the paid dividend is a negative message that carries information about the 
deterioration of a given entity's financial indicators in the future. However, it seems 
that such a clearly negative assessment is not justified in particular when the 
company implements the residual dividend policy. As pointed out by Soter et al. 
(1996), Vernimmen et al. (2014), when the company reduces the payment of 
dividends and uses its own funding sources for investment purposes and the same 
company inefficiently communicates with investors, the value for shareholders in the 
short term may decrease because the market without having full information 
misinterprets the existing situation. So if in the short term the signal resulting from 
lowering the paid dividend may or may not be interpreted negatively in the long 
term (t = 1ort = 2) when all information reaches investors, it seems that it is 
reasonable to expect a positive reaction for this type of signaling.  
 
Taking into consideration the above remarks, in further analyzes, two situations have 
been distinguished. A positive signal is assumed to be a continuation - reduction of 
payments, i.e., reduction of the level of dividend paid about the previous year in a 
situation wherein the year t = 0 the company still paid a dividend which means −1 < 
∆DIV0 < 0 and the negative signal means the cessation of payments, i.e., the 
reduction of the level of dividend paid concerning the previous year in a situation 
wherein the year t = 0 the company has not already paid a dividend, which means 
∆DIV0 = −1. 
 
To sum up, dividend omission is treated as a negative signal; In contrast, the 
reduction of dividend payments, in the short term may, due to the phenomenon of 
information asymmetry, generate a negative signal, but in the long run, as a result of 
the reduction of said asymmetry, it may be interpreted as a positive signal. Also, it 
should be noted that since companies give up dividends only as a last resort (Lintner 
1956), the failure to pay dividends, i.e., the dividend is no longer paid, is 
undoubtedly a stronger signal than the dividend reduction, i.e., the dividend is still 
paid but at a lower level than in the previous year. The results of the analyzes carried 
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Table 6. Informational content of dividend changes in relation to market value of 
equity when signals are negative 
 
-1<ΔDIV0<0 ΔDIV0=-1 
 t=0 t+1 t+2 t=0 t+1 t+2 
indicator (E0-E-1)/P-1 (E1-E0)/P-1 (E2-E1)/P-1 (E0-E-1)/P-1 (E1-E0)/P-1 (E2-E1)/P-1 
Estimate 0.2790 -0.2741 -0.1753 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 0.3265 0.3409 0.2374 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 0.8540 -0.8040 -0.7380 -2.4400 0.2940 -0.1190 
p-value (0.4080) (0.4360) (0.4730) (0.0301) (0.7730) (0.9070) 
indicator (OP0-OP-1)/P-1 (OP1-OP0)/P-1 (OP2-OP1)/P-1 (OP0-OP-1)/P-1 (OP1-OP0)/P-1 (OP2-OP1)/P-1 
Estimate 0.1092 -0.3220 -0.2665 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 0.3569 0.3030 0.2810 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 0.3060 -1.0630 -0.9490 -2.5300 0.9870 0.1500 
p-value (0.7640) (0.3070) (0.3600) (0.0251) (0.3420) (0.8830) 
indicator 
(GPoS0-GPoS-1)/P-1 (GPoS1-GPoS0)/P-1 (GPoS2-GPoS1)/P-1 (GPoS0-GPoS-1)/P-1 (GPoS1-GPoS0)/P-1 (GPoS2-GPoS1)/P-1 
Estimate -0.1473 -0.9476 -0.1541 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 0.3799 0.7978 0.1743 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student -0.3880 -1.1880 -0.8840 -1.5300 0.1480 0.0570 
p-value (0.7050) (0.2560) (0.3930) (0.1510) (0.8840) (0.9550) 
indicator (PoS0-PoS-1)/P-1 (PoS1-PoS0)/P-1 (PoS2-PoS1)/P-1 (PoS0-PoS-1)/P-1 (PoS1-PoS0)/P-1 (PoS2-PoS1)/P-1 
Estimate -0.2787 -0.8145 -0.5170 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 0.4862 0.8467 0.5082 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student -0.5730 -0.9620 -1.0170 -2.0000 1.3900 0.0100 
p-value (0.5760) (0.3540) (0.3280) (0.0672) (0.1870) (0.9930) 
indicator (PBT0-PBT-1)/P-1 (PBT1-PBT0)/P-1 (PBT2-PBT1)/P-1 (PBT0-PBT-1)/P-1 (PBT1-PBT0)/P-1 (PBT2-PBT1)/P-1 
Estimate 0.2220 -0.2990 -0.1512 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 0.2788 0.3273 0.2252 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 0.7960 -0.9130 -0.6710 -2.6500 0.2980 -0.1270 
p-value 
(0.4400) (0.3780) (0.5140) (0.0200) (0.7710) (0.9010) 
Source: Own compilation. Results are presented up to four significant digits. P-values of significance test in 
brackets below.  
 
Looking closely at the results gathered in Tables 6 and 7 in the case when −1 < 
∆DIV0 < 0, all considered indicators about the market (H1) and book values (H2) 
are statistically insignificant. In the case of relative values of indicators (H3) 
presented in 8 in turn, one can state a positive and statistically significant response 
only to one out of five indicators under study. In particular, it may be argued that the 
continuation-reduction of dividend payments carries positive current information (t 
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Table 7. Informational content of dividend changes in relation to book value of 
equity when signals are negative 
  -1<ΔDIV0<0 ΔDIV0=-1 
  t=0 t+1 t+2 t=0 t+1 t+2 
indicator 
(E0-E-1)/B-1 (E1-E0)/B-1 (E2-E1)/B-1 (E0-E-1)/B-1 (E1-E0)/B-1 (E2-E1)/B-1 
Estimate 
0.0689 -0.1040 -0.1285 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
0.2925 0.1880 0.2192 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
0.2360 -0.5530 -0.5860 -1.4400 0.2410 -0.1580 
p-value 
(0.8170) (0.5900) (0.5680) (0.1750) (0.8130) (0.8770) 
indicator 
(OP0-OP-1)/B-1 (OP1-OP0)/B-1 (OP2-OP1)/B-1 (OP0-OP-1)/B-1 (OP1-OP0)/B-1 (OP2-OP1)/B-1 
Estimate 
-0.0480 -0.1240 -0.2963 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
0.2779 0.1875 0.2670 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
-0.1730 -0.6610 -1.1100 -1.5400 0.5280 0.0520 
p-value 
(0.8660) (0.5200) (0.2870) (0.1470) (0.6060) (0.9590) 
indicator 
(GPoS0-GPoS-1)/B-1 (GPoS1-GPoS0)/B-1 (GPoS2-GPoS1)/B-1 (GPoS0-GPoS-1)/B-1 (GPoS1-GPoS0)/B-1 (GPoS2-GPoS1)/B-1 
Estimate 
-0.3811 -0.3666 -0.0470 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
0.4349 0.5459 0.1074 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
-0.8760 -0.6710 -0.4380 -1.4200 -0.2060 -0.0290 
p-value 
(0.3970) (0.5140) (0.6690) (0.1780) (0.8400) (0.9770) 
indicator 
(PoS0-PoS-1)/B-1 (PoS1-PoS0)/B-1 (PoS2-PoS1)/B-1 (PoS0-PoS-1)/B-1 (PoS1-PoS0)/B-1 (PoS2-PoS1)/B-1 
Estimate 
-0.6638 -0.1329 -0.5975 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
0.4592 0.7465 0.4514 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
-1.4460 -0.1780 -1.3240 -1.0100 0.7450 -0.1030 
p-value 
(0.1720) (0.8610) (0.2080) (0.3300) (0.4700) (0.9200) 
indicator 
(PBT0-PBT-1)/B-1 (PBT1-PBT0)/B-1 (PBT2-PBT1)/B-1 (PBT0-PBT-1)/B-1 (PBT1-PBT0)/B-1 (PBT2-PBT1)/B-1 
Estimate 
0.1699 -0.1309 -0.0920 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
0.1451 0.1108 0.1696 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
1.1720 -1.1810 -0.5420 -1.6200 0.2470 -0.1630 
p-value 
(0.2620) (0.2590) (0.5970) (0.1290) (0.8090) (0.8730) 
Source: Own compilation. Results are presented up to four significant digits. P-values of significance test in 
brackets below.  
 
When ∆DIV0 = −1, in the case of indicators calculated about the market value of 
equity (H1) 4 out of 5, and when looking at relative values of indicators (H3), 2 out 
of 5 considered indicators have been on a statistically significant level. In particular, 
it may be concluded that the cessation of dividend payments carries negative 
information for t = 0 concerning H1 and H3 for indicators based on changes in E and 
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Table 8. Informational content of dividend changes in relation to relative changes of 
value indicators when signals are negative  
  -1<ΔDIV0<0 ΔDIV0=-1 
  t=0 t+1 t+2 t=0 t+1 t+2 
indicator 
(E0/E-1)/-1 (E1/E0)-1 (E2/E1)-1 (E0/E-1)/-1 (E1/E0)-1 (E2/E1)-1 
Estimate 
0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0219 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
0.0166 0.0012 0.0155 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
0.0080 -0.5840 -1.4170 -5.3200 -0.5900 0.2680 
p-value 
(0.9940) (0.5690) (0.1800) (0.0001) (0.5650) (0.7930) 
indicator 
(OP0/OP-1)-1 (OP1/OP0)-1 (OP2/OP1)-1 (OP0/OP-1)-1 (OP1/OP0)-1 (OP2/OP1)-1 
Estimate 
-0.0074 -0.0012 -0.0028 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
0.0052 0.0028 0.0038 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
-1.4440 -0.4500 -0.7350 -0.2940 0.3480 -0.3500 
p-value 
(0.1730) (0.6600) (0.4760) (0.7740) (0.7340) (0.7320) 
indicator 
(GPoS0/GPoS-1)-1 (GPoS1/GPoS0)-1 (GPoS2/GPoS1)/-1 (GPoS0/GPoS-1)-1 (GPoS1/GPoS0)-1 (GPoS2/GPoS1)/-1 
Estimate 
-0.0056 0.0018 -0.0459 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
0.0046 0.0051 0.1070 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
-1.2260 0.3630 -0.4290 -1.8300 -0.1930 0.3380 
p-value 
(0.2420) (0.7230) (0.6750) (0.0911) (0.8500) (0.7410) 
indicator 
(PoS0/PoS-1)-1 (PoS1/PoS0)-1 (PoS2/PoS1)-1 (PoS0/PoS-1)-1 (PoS1/PoS0)-1 (PoS2/PoS1)-1 
Estimate 
0.0086 -0.0254 -0.0093 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
0.0039 0.0216 0.0127 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
2.2270 -1.1770 -0.7360 -1.4200 0.5100 0.7460 
p-value 
(0.0442) (0.2600) (0.4750) (0.1800) (0.6190) (0.4690) 
indicator 
(PBT0/PBT-1)-1 (PBT1/PBT0)-1 (PBT2/PBT1)-1 (PBT0/PBT-1)-1 (PBT1/PBT0)-1 (PBT2/PBT1)-1 
Estimate 
-0.0032 -0.0012 -0.0003 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
0.0210 0.0023 0.0023 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
-0.1500 -0.5340 -0.1470 -1.0100 -0.0200 -0.0830 
p-value 
(0.8830) (0.6030) (0.8850) (0.3320) (0.9850) (0.9350) 
Source: Own compilation. Results are presented up to four significant digits. P-values of significance test in 
brackets below.  
 
6. Robustness Checks  
 
Although the estimates of β1 have been in line with current literature and theoretical 
expectations for all significant statistical indicators, the information transferred by 
the dividends concerns only the current standing, and thus the signaling theory is not 
confirmed. In the case of H2, the tests' results have been inconclusive because all 
considered indicators have been at a statistically insignificant level. As already 
mentioned, scientists agree that dividend payments carry some information, so there 
is no agreement about what they really signal (Frankfurter et al., 2003; Benhamouda, 
2007). There is no agreement as to which measures of financial results of dividend 
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payments indicate, i.e., whether future profits or future profitability (Grullon et al., 
2002, 2005). The problem of various financial indicators expressed in profit has 
been analyzed earlier. However, the results of the tests carried out have been 
inconclusive. In the case of financial indicators expressed as profitability as well as 
with profit indicators, based on a literature study, it may be concluded that there is 
no consensus as to which rate of return is best signaled by dividend payments 
(Grullon et al., 2002, 2005, Choi et al., 2011, Liu and Chen, 2015). In this article, to 
determine the measure of financial results expressed in profitability, which would be 
most closely related to dividend signaling, six traditional profitability ratios have 
been used: 
 
1. return on equity (ROE), 
2. return on assets (ROA), 
3. return on sales (ROS), 
4. gross profit margin on sales (GPMoS), 
5. profit gross profit margin (GPM), 
6. operating profit margin (OPM). 
 
In order to ensure robustness and stability the companies in the case of which the 
government is the major shareholder, have been excluded. 
 
Table 9. Informational content of dividends in the case of future income indicators 
for non-state owned companies  
  t=0 t+1 t+2 t=0 t+1 t+2 
indicator 
ROA0-ROA-1 ROA1-ROA0 ROA2-ROA1 ROE0-ROE-1 ROE1-ROE0 ROE2-ROE1 
Estimate 
7.1563 1.3373 -1.8467 -0.0888 0.0979 -0.0065 
Std. error 
3.1684 1.3866 0.9795 0.2074 0.1514 0.0968 
t-student 
2.2590 0.9640 -1.8850 -0.4280 0.6470 -0.0680 
p-value 
(0.0417) (0.3524) (0.0819) (0.6756) (0.5291) (0.9472) 
indicator 








-0.0797 0.2457 -0.2127 1.3054 -2.6452 -0.0149 
Std. error 
0.5418 0.5464 0.7534 2.2508 2.3022 1.7563 
t-student 
-0.1470 0.4500 -0.2820 0.5800 -1.1490 -0.0080 
p-value 
(0.8853) (0.6604) (0.7822) (0.5718) (0.2713) (0.9934) 
indicator 
GPM0-GPM-1 GPM1-GPM0 GPM2-GPM1 OPM0-OPM-1 OPM1-OPM0 OPM2-OPM1 
Estimate 
-0.0839 0.2049 0.2546 1.0410 -1.7916 0.4991 
Std. error 
0.4088 0.7305 1.0765 2.6190 2.3006 1.5310 
t-student 
-0.2050 0.2800 0.2370 0.3970 -0.7790 0.3260 
p-value 
(0.8406) (0.7835) (0.8167) (0.6975) (0.4501) (0.7496) 
Source: Own compilation. Results are presented up to four significant digits. P-values of significance test in 
brackets below.  
 
Using the conventions the same as before. The first step has been to answer the 
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question: does the payment of dividends carry hidden information about the 
company's future income? The results of the analyzes carried out are presented in 
table 9. The performed estimations and statistical significance tests suggest that 
dividends' payment brings certain information only concerning the results expressed 
in the change in ROA. To get a more accurate picture of the informational content of 
dividends, similarly to the previously analyzes, the data sets have been divided into 
two events interpreted as a positive signal, i.e., continuation - increase in payouts (0 
< ∆DIV0 < 1) and initiation of payouts (∆DIV0 = 1).  
 
The results of the analyzes carried out are presented in table 10; as can be seen from 
the data included in table 10, when 0 < ∆DIV0 < 1, five out of the six indicators of 
profitability changes were at a statistically significant level and in their case the 
signaling theory has been confirmed. In particular, it may be concluded that the 
continuous increase in dividend payments carries information about positive change 
in year t = 1 and t = 2 of financial indicators expressed by changes in ROA, ROE, 
OPM as well as ROS, GPM, but only in t = 1. 
 
In contrast, when ∆DIV0 = 1, only two of the six measures of changes in 
profitability have been considered statistically significant. In particular, it may be 
concluded that in the case of dividend payment initiation, results in line with the 
conclusions from the signaling theory have been obtained in t = 1 concerning 
changes in ROA and ROE. In the case of t = 2, however, changes in ROA and ROE 
are statistically significant. Still, their assessment is negative, which means that it is 
not consistent with the signaling theory. 
 
Moving to subsequent analyzes, just as before, two more events have been 
distinguished, i.e., continuation-reduction of payments (−1 < ∆DIV0 < 0) interpreted 
as a positive signal and cessation of payments (∆DIV0 = −1) interpreted as a 
negative signal. The analysis results are presented in Table 11, as can be seen from 
the data included in table 11 in a situation where −1 < ∆DIV0 < 0 only two out of six 
considered profitability ratios and only in t = 1 have been statistically significant. In 
particular, however, it should be noted that the values of both changes in GPMoS 
and OPM have been negative and, therefore, inconsistent with the adopted 
assumptions, which means that the conclusions from the signaling theory have not 
been confirmed. In the situation, on the other hand, the withdrawal of payments, i.e., 
when ∆DIV0 = −1, only one out of six considered profitability ratios were at a 
statistically significant level. In particular, it may be noticed that discontinuation of 
dividends is carried in the case of changes in ROE on one side for t = 1 negative 
information, which is consistent with the signaling theory and, on the other hand, for 
positive information. Still, it has been the current information - neither positive nor 
negative, as could be expected. 
 
In general conclusions, the theory of dividend signaling has been confirmed mainly 
in the continuation-growth and initiation of payments. Initiation of payments 
(∆DIV0 = 1) brings positive information concerning the year t = 1, and this is partly 
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also in line with the conclusions of Healy and Palepu (1988). In particular, positive 
signaling in t = 1 is recorded concerning changes in E, OP, PoS, PBT determined by 
the market value of equity, changes E, OP, and PBT determined by the book value 
of equity as changes in ROA and ROE. 
 
Table 10. Informational content of dividends when signals are positive for non-state 




t=0 t+1 t+2 t=0 t+1 t+2 
indicator 
ROA0-ROA-1 ROA1-ROA0 ROA2-ROA1 ROA0-ROA-1 ROA1-ROA0 ROA2-ROA1 
Estimate 
0.4464 3.1715 1.5389 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
1.9085 1.0273 0.5501 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
0.2340 3.0870 2.7970 0.6700 2.3500 -3.2300 
p-value 
(0.8190) (0.0087) (0.0151) (0.5150) (0.0352) (0.0065) 
indicator 
ROE0-ROE-1 ROE1-ROE0 ROE2-ROE1 ROE0-ROE-1 ROE1-ROE0 ROE2-ROE1 
Estimate 
0.1430 1.8694 0.8882 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
0.9277 0.7360 0.3397 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
0.1540 2.5400 2.6140 0.8780 21.0000 -14.5000 
p-value 
(0.8800) (0.0247) (0.0214) (0.3960) (<0.0000) (<0.0000) 
indicator 
ROS0-ROS-1 ROS1-ROS0 ROS2-ROS1 ROS0-ROS-1 ROS1-ROS0 ROS2-ROS1 
Estimate 
0.2205 1.4358 1.2594 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
1.4260 0.9972 0.3896 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
0.1550 1.4400 3.2330 -0.2300 0.2270 0.2960 
p-value 















1.4333 0.7783 0.2357 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
1.0082 1.2253 0.5172 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
1.4220 0.6350 0.4560 0.6650 -0.5910 -0.8030 
p-value 
(0.1790) (0.5360) (0.6560) (0.5180) (0.5650) (0.4370) 
indicator 
GPM0-GPM-1 GPM1-GPM0 GPM2-GPM1 GPM0-GPM-1 GPM1-GPM0 GPM2-GPM1 
Estimate 
0.5676 1.5114 0.9588 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
1.2484 0.8857 0.3611 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
0.4550 1.7060 2.6550 -0.2330 0.1200 0.2030 
p-value 
(0.6570) (0.1120) (0.0198) (0.8200) (0.9060) (0.8420) 
indicator 
OPM0-OPM-1 OPM1-OPM0 OPM2-OPM1 OPM0-OPM-1 OPM1-OPM0 OPM2-OPM1 
Estimate 
2.1993 2.5918 1.8229 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
1.6123 0.9515 0.3762 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
1.3640 2.7240 4.8460 0.2770 -0.4120 0.0580 
p-value 
(0.1960) (0.0174) (0.0003) (0.7860) (0.6870) (0.9550) 
Source: Own compilation. Results are presented up to four significant digits. P-values of significance test in 
brackets below.  
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t=0 t+1 t+2 t=0 t+1 t+2 
indicator 
ROA0-ROA-1 ROA1-ROA0 ROA2-ROA1 ROA0-ROA-1 ROA1-ROA0 ROA2-ROA1 
Estimate 
-0.3285 -0.2072 -0.2082 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
0.9505 0.3842 0.4516 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
-0.3460 -0.5390 -0.4610 -1.5600 0.1040 0.5090 
p-value 
(0.7350) (0.5990) (0.6520) (0.1440) (0.9190) (0.6190) 
indicator 
ROE0-ROE-1 ROE1-ROE0 ROE2-ROE1 ROE0-ROE-1 ROE1-ROE0 ROE2-ROE1 
Estimate 
0.0105 -0.0136 -0.2272 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
0.5252 0.2606 0.1715 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
0.0200 -0.0520 -1.3250 3.5500 -1.9600 0.0010 
p-value 
(0.9840) (0.9590) (0.2080) (0.0036) (0.0719) (0.9990) 
indicator 
ROS0-ROS-1 ROS1-ROS0 ROS2-ROS1 ROS0-ROS-1 ROS1-ROS0 ROS2-ROS1 
Estimate 
-0.3654 -0.3228 -0.2790 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
0.6066 0.3234 0.2055 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
-0.6020 -0.9980 -1.3580 -0.7930 -0.2430 0.3050 
p-value 















0.3511 -0.8484 -0.0873 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
0.3706 0.4220 0.2758 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
0.9470 -2.0100 -0.3160 0.0640 0.7390 0.1670 
p-value 
(0.3610) (0.0656) (0.7570) (0.9500) (0.4730) (0.8700) 
indicator 
GPM0-GPM-1 GPM1-GPM0 GPM2-GPM1 GPM0-GPM-1 GPM1-GPM0 GPM2-GPM1 
Estimate 
-0.2007 -0.2955 -0.3278 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
0.6579 0.3085 0.2283 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
-0.3050 -0.9580 -1.4360 -0.0090 -0.2270 0.5490 
p-value 
(0.7650) (0.3560) (0.1750) (0.9930) (0.8240) (0.5930) 
indicator 
OPM0-OPM-1 OPM1-OPM0 OPM2-OPM1 OPM0-OPM-1 OPM1-OPM0 OPM2-OPM1 
Estimate 
-0.0513 -0.7065 -0.5214 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
Std. error 
0.6691 0.3809 0.4438 <0.0000 <0.0000 <0.0000 
t-student 
-0.0770 -1.8550 -1.1750 -0.0210 -0.0360 0.4000 
p-value 
(0.9400) (0.0864) (0.2610) (0.9840) (0.9720) (0.6950) 
Source: Own compilation. Results are presented up to four significant digits. P-values of significance test in 
brackets below.  
 
In the case of the increase-continuation of payments (0 < ∆DIV0 < 1), it may be 
stated that the event also brings positive information. This result is consistent with 
the results obtained by Chen and Kao (2014). In particular, positive responses to the 
increase in dividend payments at t = 0 are recorded to some extent in year t = 1 but 
mainly in year t = 2. In year t = 1, the signaling theory is confirmed about PBT 
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changes determined by the market value of equity and book value of equity as well 
as E, PBT, ROA, ROE, OPM changes. In the case of t = 2, however, the conclusions 
from the signaling theory have been confirmed concerning E, OP, and PBT change 
both determined by the market value of equity and book value of equity as well as 
changes in ROA, ROE, ROS, and GPM, OPM. Bearing in mind the presented 
changes in the level of paid dividend, i.e., continuation-growth and initiation, it is 
worth mentioning because it contradicts the results of Grullon et al. (2002, 2005), 
Liu and Chen (2015) often presented in the literature, i.e., that the results obtained 
concerning ROA indicate its positive relationship with ∆DIV0 (except for ∆DIV0 = 
1 and t = 2) and thus confirm the theory of signaling. 
 
In the case of cessation of payments (∆DIV0 = −1), the signaling theory's 
conclusions, i.e., the negative signal, have been confirmed only for the year t = 1 and 
only concerning changes in ROE. For other indicators used in the analyzes of the 
signaling theory carried out, it could not be confirmed. It is worth noting, which is 
also consistent with the conclusions of Benartzi et al. (1997) and Chen and Kao 
(2014), that cessation of dividend payments is admittedly a negative signal but 
brings only information about the current standing (t = 0) of the company. In 
particular, the current standing is reflected in changes in E, OP, PBT, PoS 
determined by the market value of equity, and changes in E and GPoS. However, in 
a situation of continuation-reduction of payments (−1 < ∆DIV0 < 0) where, 
according to the assumption, positive signaling is expected, none of the indicators 
used in the analysis can confirm or deny the theory of signaling. As Nissim and Ziv 
(2001) stated, it seems the same that it is reasonable to conclude that there is no link 




The informational content of dividend policy changes has been named one of the 
major concerns in the corporate finance literature. Surprisingly most studies related 
to the signaling hypothesis have been conducted in developed markets. On the 
contrary, emerging markets are rarely mentioned as a research field in this area due 
to limited data availability. This paper aims to explore the informational content of 
dividend changes taking into account the Polish stock market. In this paper, we have 
used a specific set of data from companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, 
and the gap between the existing economic theory and empirical observations is 
summarized into testable hypotheses considering links between changes in dividends 
and the future company's performance represented by the market value of equity and 
the book value of equity.  
 
The analysis presented in the article considers such indicators as the value of listed 
companies, their number, turnover, liquidity ratio, the average value of the company, 
and the ratio of capitalization to gross domestic product. In light of the situation of 
the European stock exchanges, the authors have stated that the capital market in 
Poland in the years 2000-2017 strengthened its position and reported the highest 
Are Emerging Markets Efficient? Evidence from Informational Content of Dividend Changes 
in Polish Stock Market  




growth rate, thus becoming an important market in Europe, occupying the leading 
position among the Central European stock exchanges. 
 
The obtained results confirm that dividend decisions in the audited period bring 
some information about the current situation (t = 0) and future (t = 1,t = 2) of the 
analyzed companies. It is also worth noting that among the analyzed indicators, the 
gross profit ratio (PBT) referred either to the market value or the book value of 
equity is most often in the statistically significant analyzes. Thus, it seems that, 
contrary to the adopted assumptions in the literature, gross profit (PBT) in dividend 
signaling is more important than net profit (E) and because often, the tax status of 
the analyzed enterprises is a factor that significantly affects their final yield. Our 
results confirm the validity of the signaling hypothesis in the case of continuation-
growth and initiation of payments in the Polish capital market as in the developed 
market. It is no wonder since the high growth of the capital market in Poland, 
regulatory adjustment to international requirements resulted in the decision of the 
FTSE-Russell organization at the end of 2017 on the re-qualification of this capital 
market from the developing to the developed market. Thus, Poland's stock exchange 
has been the first among the Central European countries to meet the highest global 
standards that apply to the largest stock markets in the world. The current volume of 
the capital market in Poland, the number of listed entities, their liquidity and 
reclassification of the capital market, and recognition of it as the developed market is 
a premise for verifying hypotheses about the relationship between the current 
dividend the future profits of companies. Therefore, the attempt to verify the 
hypotheses of dividend dependence and its profits for the largest Central European 
developing market is original from the research point. 
 
Finally, the attention should be paid to the fact that, although the article has exposed 
cases showing that dividends carried information about the future performance of the 
analyzed companies, it must be stated for accuracy that the obtained research results 
provide arguments for both advocates and opponents of the dividend signal theory. 
This means that the answer to whether or not what information signals dividend 
decisions remain an open question. Thus, although the" dividend puzzle" remains 
unresolved, each subsequent theoretical and empirical research may be assumed to 
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